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About Wallets & Storage

26 listings: ways to store and spend bitcoin — hardware wallets, desktop and mobile software wallets, Lightning wallets, and multisig and inheritance tools.

All 26 are in the ₿ USE · TOOL group. 8 support Lightning and 21 are open source. Who holds the bitcoin is stated for all 26: 2 Shared keys, 24 Non-Custodial. 9 carry a notice.

26 listings, grouped Bitcoin first by label. Inside each group: open source first, then the rest, then listings marked Not recommended, each A to Z here (the interactive directory rotates them weekly). Nothing is hidden. This version needs no JavaScript. Most recent Updated date here: 1 November 2026 (the day a record last changed, not a verification date).

Wallets & Storage · plain version

Plain list · 26 listings in Wallets & Storage

₿ USE · TOOL · 26

Bitcoin used directly as money, or tools for running, securing and building on it.

  1. BitBox02 ₿ USE

    Swiss-engineered hardware wallet with a Bitcoin-only edition.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC · Affiliate

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. BitBox: BitBox02

    Advisory · NEWSLETTER PROVIDER BREACHED — expect phishing (2026-09-30)

    In September 2026 attackers used a security flaw at Brevo, BitBox’s newsletter provider, to export BitBox’s subscriber list and send subscribers a fake “Critical Security Alert: Microcontroller Entropy Bug Identified” email that asked for their recovery words. The same breach hit Trezor’s newsletter. BitBox states that only subscriber email addresses were exposed, that shop orders were not affected, and that its own systems, the BitBoxApp and BitBox devices were not compromised. Never enter your recovery words anywhere except on your BitBox device; if you already did, move your funds to a new wallet.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. This was a breach at a third-party newsletter provider, not a flaw in BitBox devices or firmware. The facts above come from BitBox’s own statement and press coverage — check them yourself.

    Sources: BitBox statement (German) · The Register: Trezor, BitBox users targeted (10 September 2026)

  2. Bitkey ₿ USE

    Bitcoin wallet built by Block, for everyone.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Shared keys. Bitkey says one of three keys is held on its server and two are needed to sign: “You can always move your money without Bitkey, but Bitkey can’t move your money without you.” Bitkey: How Bitkey works

  3. Blixt Wallet ₿ USE

    Non-custodial Lightning on your phone.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Blixt: Home

  4. Blockstream App ₿ USE

    Blockstream's mobile and desktop Bitcoin wallet.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Blockstream says wallet keys are only stored on your device; its optional 2FA accounts add a second key on Blockstream’s servers, and Liquid accounts run on the federation-operated Liquid network. Blockstream App help: Set up a new wallet

    Advisory · LIQUID PEG-OUTS STILL RESTRICTED since 6 September 2026 — swaps in the Blockstream App still disabled; reserve about 550 BTC short (2026-11-01)

    On 6 September 2026 an attacker used a bug in Elements, the software Liquid runs on, to create about 4,000 L-BTC with no bitcoin behind it and withdrew about 4,000 BTC from the Liquid reserve through SideSwap, a federation member that can authorise peg-outs; Blockstream says 3,400 BTC were returned on 7 September, and its report of 23 September said about 602 BTC were still the subject of recovery efforts. Liquid transactions resumed on 10 September, and since the week of 20 October swaps between L-BTC and bitcoin run again through participating providers at a 1:1 rate, including AQUA, Bull Bitcoin and SideSwap, according to the Liquid Federation, which says direct federation peg-outs stay restricted until full 1:1 backing is restored and its remaining security and operational requirements are met, and gives no date; on 1 November 2026 the third-party explorer liquid.network showed about 3,717 BTC in the reserve against about 4,267 L-BTC in circulation, a gap of about 550 BTC. Blockstream’s help centre still says new swaps in the Blockstream App are temporarily disabled because of a service interruption with its swap partner, with no restoration timeline (article updated 10 August 2026, before the Liquid incident). The facts above come from Blockstream’s incident report and help centre, the Liquid Federation’s blog and Telegram channel, and the liquid.network explorer — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice, because Liquid still runs and Blockstream and the Liquid Federation have published what happened and what has to happen before peg-outs reopen. Until peg-outs reopen, L-BTC converts back to bitcoin through participating swap providers, whose terms we have not checked, not through the federation directly and not through the app’s own swaps while those stay disabled; bitcoin held on-chain is separate and not affected.

    Sources: Blockstream: “Liquid Network Security Incident Assessment” (23 September 2026) · Liquid Federation: “Liquid Network Staged Recovery Update” (20 October 2026) · Liquid Federation on Telegram: swaps through AQUA, Bull Bitcoin and SideSwap, peg-outs still restricted (28 October 2026) · Blockstream help centre: “Why are swaps unavailable?” (updated 10 August 2026) · liquid.network proof of reserves: federation reserve and L-BTC in circulation (checked 1 November 2026)

  5. Blockstream Jade ₿ USE

    Open-source hardware wallet from Blockstream.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Blockstream: Jade

  6. BlueWallet ₿ USE

    Mobile Bitcoin wallet; Lightning via your own node.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. BlueWallet: Home

  7. Cake Wallet ₿ USE

    Self-custody mobile and desktop wallet for Bitcoin, Lightning and Monero.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Cake says only you ever hold your keys; in-app swaps run through third-party providers who hold funds during the swap, under their own terms. Cake Wallet: Common questions

  8. Electrum ₿ USE

    Lightweight open-source Bitcoin desktop wallet, since 2011.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Electrum: Home

  9. Envoy ₿ USE

    Foundation's mobile companion for Passport hardware wallet.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Foundation: Envoy

    Advisory · PHISHING EMAILS impersonating Foundation, customer data exposed — "Your Passport funds are at risk" is a scam (2026-11-01)

    On 25 and 26 October 2026 emails that appeared to come from official Foundation domains, including ones claiming "Your Passport funds are at risk", went to Foundation customers and others; Foundation says attackers reached part of its backend through a vulnerability in a self-hosted application, were likely able to access its customer support inbox, and made more than 23,000 phishing email attempts through its email systems before it shut sending down and revoked all API keys. Foundation treats records with names, email addresses, about 5,600 mailing addresses and about 5,200 phone numbers, from old WooCommerce orders and Shopify orders since May, as potentially exposed, says it has found no evidence that Passport devices or the private keys they hold were compromised, and has not said how many people received the emails. Since 30 October new phishing emails titled "Your Passport replacement" and "Incident report: your Passport wallet is being drained" have come from other domains, along with a fake Foundation website; Foundation says anyone who entered their recovery phrase should move their funds to a new wallet with a fresh seed straight away, and that it will publish a full report when its investigation is complete. The facts above come from Foundation's security notice on its community forum (26 October, updated 31 October) and the alert on foundation.xyz — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. According to Foundation this is an email and customer-data exposure, not a flaw in Passport devices or Envoy, and its investigation is ongoing; we update this notice when Foundation publishes its full report. Never type your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation.

    Sources: Foundation: "Important security notice: emails that appeared to come from Foundation" (26 October 2026, updated 31 October) · Foundation: security alert on foundation.xyz · Unchained: Foundation traces phishing emails to a backend breach (26 October 2026)

  10. Foundation Passport ₿ USE

    Open-source hardware wallets: Passport Prime and Passport Core.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Foundation: Passport Prime

    Advisory · PHISHING EMAILS impersonating Foundation, customer data exposed — "Your Passport funds are at risk" is a scam (2026-11-01)

    On 25 and 26 October 2026 emails that appeared to come from official Foundation domains, including ones claiming "Your Passport funds are at risk", went to Foundation customers and others; Foundation says attackers reached part of its backend through a vulnerability in a self-hosted application, were likely able to access its customer support inbox, and made more than 23,000 phishing email attempts through its email systems before it shut sending down and revoked all API keys. Foundation treats records with names, email addresses, about 5,600 mailing addresses and about 5,200 phone numbers, from old WooCommerce orders and Shopify orders since May, as potentially exposed, says it has found no evidence that Passport devices or the private keys they hold were compromised, and has not said how many people received the emails. Since 30 October new phishing emails titled "Your Passport replacement" and "Incident report: your Passport wallet is being drained" have come from other domains, along with a fake Foundation website; Foundation says anyone who entered their recovery phrase should move their funds to a new wallet with a fresh seed straight away, and that it will publish a full report when its investigation is complete. The facts above come from Foundation's security notice on its community forum (26 October, updated 31 October) and the alert on foundation.xyz — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. According to Foundation this is an email and customer-data exposure, not a flaw in Passport devices or Envoy, and its investigation is ongoing; we update this notice when Foundation publishes its full report. Never type your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation.

    Sources: Foundation: "Important security notice: emails that appeared to come from Foundation" (26 October 2026, updated 31 October) · Foundation: security alert on foundation.xyz · Unchained: Foundation traces phishing emails to a backend breach (26 October 2026)

  11. Keystone ₿ USE

    Open-source air-gapped hardware wallet.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Keystone: Home

    Advisory · WEBSITE BREACHED, DEVICE-AUTHENTICATION KEY STOLEN — Keystone is scrapping 18,835 unsold units (2026-11-01)

    Keystone says it detected unauthorized access to its website on 20 October 2026; on 24 October it disclosed that customer names, contact details, shipping addresses and order details had been taken, and on 26 October it said the exposure covers 25,964 buyer records from website orders made in 2024 to 2026 and that the intruder also took the WebAuth key its devices use to prove they are genuine. Keystone says the key plays no part in creating seeds or signing transactions and that owners do not need to move their funds because of the incident, but an attacker holding it could make counterfeit devices pass the authenticity check; it is scrapping the 18,835 unsold units that carry the key, has paused shipping from its website until devices with a new key are ready, and says it cannot completely rule out that a device received after 20 October is counterfeit even if the check passes, so owners of such devices should contact its support before using them. Keystone says it will not ask anyone to return a device or for a recovery phrase or private key, and warns of fake refund, replacement and recall offers. The facts above come from Keystone's posts on X of 24 and 26 October, as reported by The Hacker News, Bankless and The Block — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice, while Keystone replaces the affected inventory and says seeds and keys are not exposed. We update this notice when Keystone publishes its detailed report or confirms the fix. Never type your recovery phrase anywhere except on your own device.

    Sources: Keystone on X: data breach disclosure (24 October 2026) · Keystone on X: update on the authentication key (26 October 2026) · The Hacker News: Keystone to destroy 18,835 hardware wallets after hackers steal device verification key (27 October 2026) · Bankless: Keystone breach widens as attacker grabs its device authentication key (26 October 2026) · The Block: Keystone customers say breach exposed data the hardware wallet maker promised to delete (25 October 2026)

  12. Liana ₿ USE

    Bitcoin wallet with built-in inheritance planning.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Liana: Home

  13. Phoenix Wallet ₿ USE

    Lightning payments, simplified.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. ACINQ: Phoenix splicing update

  14. Proton Wallet ₿ USE

    Bitcoin wallet by the makers of ProtonMail.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Proton: Wallet

  15. SeedSigner ₿ USE

    DIY air-gapped signing device.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. SeedSigner: README

  16. Sparrow Wallet ₿ USE

    Privacy-focused desktop Bitcoin wallet.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Sparrow’s docs say you create a wallet “with the private keys in Sparrow” or connect a hardware wallet, and “write these words down for safekeeping”. Sparrow Wallet docs: Quick Start

  17. Specter Desktop ₿ USE

    Multisig Bitcoin wallet for your own node.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Specter: Desktop

  18. Trezor ₿ USE

    Open-source hardware wallets from SatoshiLabs, based in Prague.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC · Affiliate

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Trezor: Home

    Advisory · IMPLANT REPORTED in a Trezor bought from CryptoBilis — customer data also exposed at two vendors, expect phishing (2026-11-01)

    On 28 October 2026 Trezor received a responsible-disclosure report of a hardware implant with a cellular module inside a Trezor Safe 5 bought in August 2026 from CryptoBilis, an official Trezor reseller in Southeast Asia until Trezor removed it on 9 October; as of 30 October Trezor had not yet received the device, was treating the report as credible, and said no CryptoBilis buyer had reported a loss of funds. Trezor advises anyone who bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards and uses it to store funds to move them to a new wallet with a new seed, and offers those buyers a replacement device or a voucher. Separately, Trezor disclosed a breach at its shipping provider ShipMonk on 13 August (80,689 customers affected after the 4 September update, about 67,000 of them US customers whose orders date from November 2019 to August 2021) and a breach at its newsletter provider Brevo on 10 September (on 17 September Trezor said Brevo had confirmed that 347,149 marketing email contacts were exported), and states that its own systems, hardware wallets, private keys and wallet backups were not affected. The facts above come from Trezor's own announcements — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. The two data exposures were at third-party vendors, and the implant report concerns one device sold through a reseller, not a flaw in Trezor firmware, according to Trezor; Trezor says it will update its notice if the device is examined or losses are reported. We recommend buying a Trezor only directly from Trezor’s own shop, never through a reseller. Never enter your recovery words anywhere except on your own Trezor device.

    Sources: Trezor: implant reported in a Trezor sold by CryptoBilis (30 October 2026) · Trezor: shipping provider incident (13 August 2026, updated 4 September) · Trezor: Brevo email provider incident (10 September 2026, updated 17 September)

  19. Wasabi Wallet ₿ USE

    Privacy-focused Bitcoin wallet with CoinJoin.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Wasabi: Docs

  20. Zeus ₿ USE

    Your node, your wallet, your Lightning.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · Lightning · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. ZEUS lists itself as self-custodial; its docs say the optional Cashu ecash feature is custodial, with a risk of the mint stealing your funds. ZEUS docs: About ZEUS

  21. Ledger ₿ USE

    Paris-based maker of the Nano, Stax and Flex hardware wallets.

    Wallets & Storage · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Ledger’s optional paid Ledger Recover splits an encrypted copy of your private key into three fragments held by Coincover, Ledger and EscrowTech; two of the three restore it, according to Ledger. Ledger: Ledger Recover

    Advisory · TAMPERED DEVICES sold through resellers in Southeast Asia — Ledger says its own systems were not compromised (2026-11-01)

    On 9 October 2026 Ledger began investigating fund losses reported by buyers of devices sold by CryptoBilis, a reseller in Southeast Asia, and on 15 October it said a criminal group had bought genuine Ledger devices, fitted hidden components built to capture the recovery phrase during setup, and put them back into distribution through resellers in Southeast Asia. Ledger states there was no flaw in its chip, operating system or servers, has asked resellers and distributors in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong to suspend sales, and on 13 October said the only confirmed incidents were in Southeast Asia; after one customer in Germany reported an implant, with no loss of funds reported, MediaMarkt Saturn paused Ledger sales there, and Ledger says the devices it then examined from stores and warehouses, including in Germany, were clean. Ledger has not confirmed the number of affected users or a total loss, and outside estimates differ; its advice of 9 October is that if you bought from CryptoBilis in the last 90 days and have not set the device up, don't, and if you have, consider moving your funds to a new device with a new recovery phrase; separately, in January 2026 Ledger disclosed that its e-commerce partner Global-e had been breached, exposing customers' names, addresses, phone numbers and order details but, according to Ledger and Global-e, not payment data or recovery phrases. The facts above come from Ledger's blog post of 15 October and its posts on X as reported by The Hacker News — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. Ledger describes a localized distribution attack, not a flaw in its devices or systems, and says its investigation continues with law enforcement; we update this notice when it publishes its findings. We recommend buying a Ledger only directly from Ledger’s own shop, never through a reseller. A new device never comes with recovery words already written down, and Ledger says it will never ask for your 24 words.

    Sources: Ledger: "Ledger's Response to the Hardware Implant Attack" (15 October 2026) · Ledger Support on X, 9 October · Ledger Support on X, 10 October · The Hacker News: Ledger finds unauthorized hardware implant (12 October, updated 13 October) · Ledger: Global-e incident (January 2026)

  22. Muun Wallet ₿ USE

    Bitcoin and Lightning wallet, self-custodial according to Muun.

    Wallets & Storage · Lightning · No-KYC

    Shared keys. Muun describes itself as self-custodial and a 2-of-2 multisig wallet, with one key on your phone and both in your Emergency Kit; its 2021 blog says “you and Muun will cooperate for daily transactions.” Muun: Home

  23. NGRAVE ₿ USE

    Air-gapped hardware wallet with QR-code signing.

    Wallets & Storage · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. NGRAVE: Home

    Advisory · FAKE SECURITY ALERT led to thefts from about 70 wallet addresses — NGRAVE says no ZERO device was breached (2026-11-01)

    On 17 October 2026 attackers who had hijacked access to a third-party provider that sends push notifications for NGRAVE's LIQUID app sent a fake security alert that led to a copy of NGRAVE's website asking for a recovery phrase or Perfect Key; NGRAVE says it has traced about $2.56 million, at 17 October prices, taken from about 70 wallet addresses on four networks, and calls that figure a minimum. NGRAVE states that the attacker never had access to any ZERO device or its keys and that the LIQUID app's code was not breached, but that the attacker copied the app's notification list (phone model, operating system, country, time zone, usage data and possibly IP address and approximate location), could read swap history and app usage data, and may know the wallet addresses of people who opened LIQUID around the time of the attack. NGRAVE says it replaced every key used by its live systems, is working with each affected person and with law enforcement, and is reporting the exposure to the Belgian Data Protection Authority, and its CEO wrote that the company had failed in its first duty as a security company. The facts above come from NGRAVE's incident report of 19 October 2026 — check them yourself.

    Our position: listed, with this notice. According to NGRAVE the losses came from recovery phrases typed into a fake site, not from a flaw in the ZERO, and further security changes are still to come. NGRAVE says it will never ask for your recovery phrase or Perfect Key.

    Sources: NGRAVE: "Incident report: the fake LIQUID security alert of 17 October" (19 October 2026)

  24. Nunchuk ₿ USE

    Multisig Bitcoin wallet with inheritance planning.

    Wallets & Storage · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Nunchuk’s FAQ says inheritance claims need its platform key’s signature, yet “your own keys can spend without Nunchuk”; its pricing page lists DIY wallets on the Free plan and assisted multisig wallets on paid plans. Nunchuk: FAQ

  25. Tangem ₿ USE

    Bitcoin in a card — no seed phrase needed.

    Wallets & Storage · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Tangem: Home

  26. Coldcard ₿ USE

    Bitcoin-only, air-gapped hardware wallet.

    Wallets & Storage · Open Source · No-KYC

    Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Coinkite: COLDCARD

    Not recommended · NOT RECOMMENDED — seed-generation flaw · detailed post-mortem not yet published · proposed class action in Ontario (2026-11-01)

    A firmware bug weakened the randomness Coldcard used to create recovery phrases (seeds): since March 2021, seed generation used a software fallback instead of the hardware random-number generator. Coinkite's advisory (updated 1 August 2026) lists the affected seeds: on Mk2 and Mk3, seeds made on firmware 4.0.1 to 4.1.9; on Mk4, Mk5 and Q, seeds made before firmware 5.6.0 (Mk4, Mk5), 1.5.0Q (Q), 6.6.0X and 6.6.0QX (Edge), which have about 72 bits of entropy instead of the expected 128. From 30 July 2026 attackers rebuilt private keys from weak seeds and took the funds: the independent tracker coldcardwatch.com counts at least 1,405 BTC taken from 4,925 addresses on 30 and 31 July 2026 and calls its figures minimums. Updating the firmware does not repair an existing seed. If your seed was made on an affected Coldcard without at least 50 independent, private dice rolls: update the firmware, make a new seed and move your funds. A strong, unique passphrase adds a barrier but does not repair the seed. On 4 August Coinkite wrote: "We'll cover this fully in our post-mortem." As of 1 November 2026 that post-mortem has not been published; Coinkite's security status page calls itself a living post-mortem and remediation record and says a separate detailed technical post-mortem is still in preparation. On 11 September 2026 a proposed class action against Coinkite Inc. and its co-founders Rodolfo Novak and Peter D. Gray was issued in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Toronto (court file CV-26-00018158-0000); its allegations have not been tested in court, and Coinkite told Bitcoin.com News it cannot comment on pending litigation. Since 4 August Coinkite has released three firmware updates, among them required user-sourced entropy (20 August) and verifiable seed mixing (4 September). On 11 October 2026 a post on Coldcard's X account linked to a phishing site; Coldcard deleted it and said it was investigating. Coldcard's website is coldcard.com. Never type your recovery words into a website. The facts above come from Coinkite's advisory, blog and security status page, coldcardwatch.com and the statement of claim — check them yourself.

    Our position: not recommended until an independent audit of the entropy path and a full public post-mortem are published. Coinkite's status page lists four outside reviews of the fix and says the published evidence does not establish a complete independent audit.

    Sources: Coinkite security advisory · Coinkite technical backgrounder · Coldcard security status page · Independent drain tracker (coldcardwatch.com) · Statement of claim, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, file CV-26-00018158-0000 (CBA National Class Action Database)

    Website: coldcard.com