Browser tabs open on The Orange Pages (two tabs count as two). Each tab gets a random number in your browser; it is never linked to you or your IP, and it is deleted once the day's total is counted, a few hours after midnight (UTC). Only the daily totals are kept.
Free to list · no ads · no paid placements
Free directory · free to list · submissions welcome · no ads · no paid placements. No cookies, no accounts, no IP logging by us. Visits are counted by Cloudflare Web Analytics and by our own counter of random tab numbers.
Page
26 listings: ways to store and spend bitcoin — hardware wallets, desktop and mobile software wallets, Lightning wallets, and multisig and inheritance tools.
All 26 are in the ₿ USE · TOOL group. 8 support Lightning and 21 are open source. Who holds the bitcoin is stated for all 26: 2 Shared keys, 24 Non-Custodial. 5 carry a notice.
26 listings, grouped Bitcoin first by label. Inside each group: open source first, then the rest, then listings marked Not recommended, each A to Z here (the interactive directory rotates them weekly). Nothing is hidden. This version needs no JavaScript. Most recent Updated date here: 23 October 2026 (the day a record last changed, not a verification date).
How listings are checked → · Storing Bitcoin Safely (Section 4) →
Bitcoin used directly as money, or tools for running, securing and building on it.
BitBox02 ₿ USE
Swiss minimal Bitcoin hardware wallet.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. BitBox: BitBox02
Advisory · NEWSLETTER PROVIDER BREACHED — expect phishing (2026-09-30)
In September 2026 attackers used a security flaw at Brevo, BitBox’s newsletter provider, to export BitBox’s subscriber list and send subscribers a fake “Critical Security Alert: Microcontroller Entropy Bug Identified” email that asked for their recovery words. The same breach hit Trezor’s newsletter. BitBox states that only subscriber email addresses were exposed, that shop orders were not affected, and that its own systems, the BitBoxApp and BitBox devices were not compromised. Never enter your recovery words anywhere except on your BitBox device; if you already did, move your funds to a new wallet.
Our position: listed, with this notice. This was a breach at a third-party newsletter provider, not a flaw in BitBox devices or firmware. The facts above come from BitBox’s own statement and press coverage — check them yourself.
Sources: BitBox statement (German) · The Register: Trezor, BitBox users targeted (10 September 2026)
Bitkey ₿ USE
Bitcoin wallet built by Block, for everyone.
Shared keys. Bitkey says one of three keys is held on its server and two are needed to sign: “You can always move your money without Bitkey, but Bitkey can’t move your money without you.” Bitkey: How Bitkey works
Blixt Wallet ₿ USE
Non-custodial Lightning on your phone.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Blixt: Home
Blockstream App ₿ USE
Secure, beginner-friendly Bitcoin wallet.
Non-Custodial. Blockstream says wallet keys are only stored on your device; its optional 2FA accounts add a second key on Blockstream’s servers, and Liquid accounts run on the federation-operated Liquid network. Blockstream App help: Set up a new wallet
Advisory · LIQUID PEG-OUTS PAUSED since 6 September 2026 — about 602 BTC not yet recovered, no reopening date (2026-10-12)
Blockstream App can hold L-BTC (bitcoin on the Liquid sidechain) next to on-chain bitcoin, and its Lightning payments settle through swaps between Lightning and L-BTC. Blockstream’s help centre (updated 10 August 2026, before the Liquid incident) says new swaps in the app are disabled because of “a service interruption with our swap partner”, so the app cannot send or receive Lightning payments or swap between bitcoin and L-BTC, that funds are safe and the rest of the app works normally, and that there is “no restoration timeline yet”; on 17 September Liquid said the app’s LBTC<>BTC and LBTC<>Lightning swap routes remain unavailable until peg-outs are restored. On 6 September 2026 an attacker used a bug in Elements, the software Liquid runs on, to create about 4,000 L-BTC with no bitcoin behind it, then withdrew about 4,000 BTC from the Liquid reserve through SideSwap, a federation member that can authorise peg-outs. Blockstream says the reserve fell from about 4,205 BTC to 197 BTC, that 3,400 BTC were returned on 7 September, and that about 602 BTC are still the subject of recovery efforts; on 12 October 2026 the third-party explorer liquid.network (The Mempool Open Source Project) showed about 3,632 BTC in the reserve against about 4,235 L-BTC in circulation. Blockstream’s co-founder and CEO, Adam Back, wrote on X on 10 September that the 1:1 peg would be covered (“answer YES”); he did not say how or when. Blockstream deployed an emergency patch within hours, Liquid transactions resumed on 10 September, and Blockstream says other Liquid-issued assets were not affected. Peg-outs (the way to turn L-BTC back into bitcoin through the federation) remain paused; liquid.net still said so on 12 October 2026. On 17 September Liquid said it could not yet give a firm date and that peg-outs “will resume only after full 1:1 BTC backing for LBTC has been confirmed and all required software updates, testing and independent security reviews have been completed.” On 29 September it said an independent external security audit of Elements v23.3.4 was underway and that the federation was updating its peg-out key list, replacing existing entries and securing all peg-out keys in cold storage; it said it expected to share further updates “shortly”, and by 12 October it had posted none.
Our position: listed, with this notice, because Liquid still runs and Blockstream and Liquid have published what happened and what has to happen before peg-outs reopen. Until peg-outs reopen, L-BTC cannot be turned back into bitcoin through the federation; bitcoin held on-chain is separate and not affected. The facts above come from Blockstream’s incident report and help centre, posts on X by Liquid and Adam Back, liquid.net and the liquid.network explorer — check them yourself.
Sources: Blockstream: “Liquid Network Security Incident Assessment” (23 September 2026) · Blockstream help centre: “Why are swaps unavailable?” (updated 10 August 2026) · Liquid Network on X: update of 29 September 2026, 05:48 UTC (audit of Elements, new peg-out keys)
Blockstream Jade ₿ USE
Open-source hardware wallet from Blockstream.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Blockstream: Jade
BlueWallet ₿ USE
Mobile wallet for Bitcoin and Lightning.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. BlueWallet: Home
Cake Wallet ₿ USE
Self-custody mobile and desktop wallet for Bitcoin, Lightning and Monero.
Non-Custodial. Cake says only you ever hold your keys; in-app swaps run through third-party providers who hold funds during the swap, under their own terms. Cake Wallet: Common questions
Electrum ₿ USE
Lightweight open-source Bitcoin desktop wallet, since 2011.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Electrum: Home
Envoy ₿ USE
Foundation's mobile companion for Passport hardware wallet.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Foundation: Envoy
Foundation Passport ₿ USE
Open-source hardware wallets: Passport Prime and Passport Core.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Foundation: Passport Prime
Keystone ₿ USE
Open-source air-gapped hardware wallet.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Keystone: Home
Liana ₿ USE
Bitcoin wallet with built-in inheritance planning.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Liana: Home
Phoenix Wallet ₿ USE
Lightning payments, simplified.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. ACINQ: Phoenix splicing update
Proton Wallet ₿ USE
Bitcoin wallet by the makers of ProtonMail.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Proton: Wallet
SeedSigner ₿ USE
DIY air-gapped signing device.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. SeedSigner: README
Sparrow Wallet ₿ USE
Privacy-focused desktop Bitcoin wallet.
Non-Custodial. Sparrow’s docs say you create a wallet “with the private keys in Sparrow” or connect a hardware wallet, and “write these words down for safekeeping”. Sparrow Wallet docs: Quick Start
Specter Desktop ₿ USE
Multisig Bitcoin wallet for your own node.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Specter: Desktop
Trezor ₿ USE
Open-source hardware wallets from SatoshiLabs, based in Prague.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Trezor: Home
Advisory · CUSTOMER DATA EXPOSED at two vendors — expect phishing (2026-10-12)
On 13 August 2026 Trezor disclosed a breach at its shipping provider ShipMonk; after an update on 4 September 2026 Trezor says 80,689 customers are affected. For 1,947 of them the exposed data was name, city and email address; for the others it was name, email address, phone number and shipping address, including about 67,000 US customers whose orders were placed between November 2019 and August 2021. On 10 September 2026 Trezor disclosed a separate breach at its newsletter provider Brevo: a fake “Critical Security Alert: STM32 Entropy Vulnerability” email contained a link to an app that asked recipients to enter their wallet backup, and on 17 September Trezor said Brevo had confirmed that 347,149 marketing email contacts were exported. Trezor states that its own systems, hardware wallets, private keys and wallet backups were not affected. Expect phishing by email, phone and post: never enter your recovery words anywhere except on your Trezor device, and if you already did, move your funds to a new wallet.
Our position: listed, with this notice. These were data exposures at third-party vendors, not a flaw in Trezor devices or firmware. The facts above come from Trezor’s own announcements — check them yourself.
Sources: Trezor: shipping provider incident (13 August 2026, updated 4 September) · Trezor: Brevo email provider incident (10 September 2026)
Wasabi Wallet ₿ USE
Privacy-focused Bitcoin wallet with CoinJoin.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Wasabi: Docs
Zeus ₿ USE
Your node, your wallet, your Lightning.
Non-Custodial. ZEUS lists itself as self-custodial; its docs say the optional Cashu ecash feature is custodial, with a risk of the mint stealing your funds. ZEUS docs: About ZEUS
Ledger ₿ USE
Paris-based maker of the Nano and Stax hardware wallets.
Non-Custodial. Ledger’s optional paid Ledger Recover splits an encrypted copy of your private key into three fragments held by Coincover, Ledger and EscrowTech; two of the three restore it, according to Ledger. Ledger: Ledger Recover
Advisory · Security advisory — drained wallets traced to one reseller (October 2026) (2026-10-12)
On 9 October 2026 Ledger said that, from what it knew, the drained wallets reported to it were limited to devices sold by CryptoBilis, a reseller Ledger lists for Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and that it had "no indication that Ledger's security infrastructure, systems or services have been compromised." On 10 October Ledger said one affected user's device contained an unauthorized hardware implant; it has not said that the implant explains all the losses. CryptoBilis has stopped selling hardware wallets while the investigation runs. On-chain researchers estimate the losses at more than $72 million to more than $86 million, on Bitcoin, Ethereum and Tron; Ledger has not confirmed a total. Ledger's advice: if you bought from CryptoBilis in the last 90 days and have not set the device up, don't; if you have, move your funds to a new wallet with a new recovery phrase. Earlier: in January 2026 Ledger disclosed that its e-commerce partner Global-e had been breached, exposing customers' names, postal and email addresses, phone numbers and order details. Ledger and Global-e state that payment data and recovery phrases were not affected. Expect phishing: a new device never comes with recovery words already written down, and Ledger says it will never ask for your 24 words.
Our position: listed, with this notice. Ledger's investigation is ongoing; we update this notice when it publishes its findings.
Sources: Ledger Support on X, 9 October · Ledger Support on X, 10 October · Ledger: Global-e incident (January 2026)
Muun Wallet ₿ USE
Simple Bitcoin and Lightning wallet, self-custodial according to Muun.
Shared keys. Muun describes itself as self-custodial and a 2-of-2 multisig wallet, with one key on your phone and both in your Emergency Kit; its 2021 blog says “you and Muun will cooperate for daily transactions.” Muun: Home
NGRAVE ₿ USE
The coldest hardware wallet in the world.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. NGRAVE: Home
Nunchuk ₿ USE
Multisig Bitcoin wallet with inheritance planning.
Non-Custodial. Nunchuk’s FAQ says inheritance claims need its platform key’s signature, yet “your own keys can spend without Nunchuk”; its pricing page lists DIY wallets on the Free plan and assisted multisig wallets on paid plans. Nunchuk: FAQ
Tangem ₿ USE
Bitcoin in a card — no seed phrase needed.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Tangem: Home
Coldcard ₿ USE
Bitcoin-only, air-gapped hardware wallet.
Non-Custodial. Only you hold the keys to your bitcoin. Coinkite: COLDCARD
Not recommended · NOT RECOMMENDED — seed-generation flaw · no post-mortem yet (2026-10-12)
A firmware bug weakened the randomness Coldcard used to create recovery phrases (seeds): since March 2021, seed generation used a software fallback instead of the hardware random-number generator. Coinkite's advisory (updated 1 August 2026) lists the affected seeds: on Mk2 and Mk3, seeds made on firmware 4.0.1 to 4.1.9; on Mk4, Mk5 and Q, seeds made before firmware 5.6.0 (Mk4, Mk5), 1.5.0Q (Q), 6.6.0X and 6.6.0QX (Edge), which have about 72 bits of entropy instead of the expected 128. From 30 July 2026 attackers rebuilt private keys from weak seeds and took the funds: the independent tracker coldcardwatch.com counts at least 1,405 BTC from 4,925 addresses. Updating the firmware does not repair an existing seed. If your seed was made on an affected Coldcard without at least 50 independent, private dice rolls: update the firmware, make a new seed and move your funds. A strong, unique passphrase adds a barrier but does not repair the seed. On 4 August Coinkite wrote: "We'll cover this fully in our post-mortem." As of 12 October 2026 no post-mortem has been published. Since 4 August Coinkite has released three firmware updates, among them required user-sourced entropy (20 August) and verifiable seed mixing (4 September). On 11 October 2026 a post on Coldcard's X account linked to a phishing site; Coldcard deleted it and is investigating. Coldcard's website is coldcard.com. Never type your recovery words into a website.
Our position: not recommended until an independent audit of the entropy path and a full public post-mortem are published. The facts above are verifiable — check them yourself.
Sources: Coinkite security advisory · Coinkite technical backgrounder · Independent drain tracker (coldcardwatch.com)
Website: coldcard.com